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THE SA~T- OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
DEREK SHEARER 
The economic system does not work. And the reforms re- . 
quired to ~ake it work-to make it work uniformly and for 
individuals; not the corpora~ions-are far more fundamental 
than anything contemplated by the cheap and soft and easy-
going liberalism of these last years. . 
John Kenneth Galbraith in 
Who Needs the Democrats? (1970) 
Two years ago, during the worst peri9d of the inflation and 
recession; Business Week ran a cover story, illustrated with 
po~raits of the great economic thinkers of_ the_~st­
Marshall. Marx, Sinith, Keynes and others-speculating 
on· when, or whether, a new theorist would appe"ar to 
unravel the ecQnomy's conimdrums .. But an explanation of 
current difficulties is not apt to be found in some· new, all-
embracing theory. To find answers to the basic flaws in the 
American economy, we must look beyond economics to 
political economy. . 
For example, most economists agree that inf!ation could. 
neecf not inean total or-even eXtensive public ownership;· 
particularly of the nationalization variety. "The objective is 
not wholly to destroy private ownership," wrote Brit1sh 
Labour Party Minister CA.R. Crosland, ""but to alter its 
distribution." 
Ownership of business enterprise should be more 
heterogeneous and diffused, "with the goverriinent-state 
and local, as well as federal-unions; churches, pension 
funds, workers, community groups and private fam11ies all 
participating. if the United States is to approach such a 
pluralist economy; it must effect a dramatic increase in 
public enterprise, as ~ell as ~in cooperatives, community 
development corporations and worker-owned enterprises. 
. ' 
Public. control· of the economy will also entail mO]IJe 
explicit eco_nomic planning. Establishment .figures rangi8g. 
from economist Herbert Stein to investmenfbanker Robert 
Roosa have recently recognized the limitations of I\.eyne~~ 
ian policies; they advocate ·the creation of a national 
economic planning agency. · . 
However, the experience of European cQuntries suggests 
that national economic planning_ works only where there is 
a large public sector. Andrew Shonfield concludes in 
. Modern Capitalism: 
. What is called "indicative planning," that is a system 
which relies ori pointing out desirable ends rather than on 
giving orders to achieve them, can be relied upon to work · 
effectively only in a situation where there is a central core of 
important enterprises which are more. responsive to the 
desires of the state than ordinary private firms. 
In France, where th~ major banks and insurance com· 
parties, an auto firm (Renault), an aviation firm, as well as 
coat, electricity, gas, railroads and telephones are p!,l\>~y 
owned, national economic planning of the non~~ 
variety has worked. with a good measure of success. 
Attempts at similar planning ~ _ Britain, which has a 
smaller public sector and one concentrated in utilities, 
have not produced very good results. Recognizing this fact, 
the current Labour government has proposed that 
planning agreements be drawn up between the govern_ment 
and the leading corporations, and that a state holding 
company called tl_le National Enterprise Board t;.!! estab-
lished to purchase controlling shares in . twenty to 
tw~nty-five of the major firms in the country. 
The existence of public firms in the leading sectors of 
the economy means not only that. planners will be in touch 
with enterprises that are responsive to their signals but also 
that, because these firms are public, planners will have 
access to data 'from which they can judge the performance 
o.f private "firms.' Without such information, planners are in 
the position of American regulatory agencies that passively 
receive information provided by private firms,' with little 
basis for judging the economic soundness of the informa-
tion or of the investment plans which the private com-
panies propose. Where such data exist the public has 
almost always benefited. It was the public disclosure by 
TV A of identical bid-s for electrical equipment that broke 
the G.E. price-fixing scandal. 
the best explanation oft~necessity_for a large dose of 
public entefprise in a privately dominated economy has 
·:heeft expressed by: Pasquale Saraceno, chief economiSt of 
Italy's 'Industrial .Reconstruction Institute. lRI is a state 
holding company which-owns three_of Italy's largest banks, 
the n~t1onal airliae-Alitalia, the main shipping eot.npanies, 
Italian radio ai}a television, and most of "the telephone 
system. lRI has buj)t more than half of the country's high-
ways. In manufacturing, it produces 60 per cent of ItaJ'tan 
steel, owns the Alfa Romeo company and has interests in a 
number of engineering companies. · 
Saraceno argues that, as capitalist development pro-
gresses, competition is retarded by oligopolistic tendencies, 
and growth itself is restricted and distorted by structural 
defici~ncies which the market mechanism alone cannot 
solve, . Nor will these structural problems be resolved by 
Keynesian demand management. They manifest them-
selves .in three basic conditions: structural unemployment, 
regional unemployment and underemployment, and sec-
torial underinvestment. 
· All these conditions .exist in the American economy. 
Signs of u"neven development are all" around us. Some areas 
of the country are relatively rich in income and services, 
while others are poverty-stricken. Within regions, sections 
of cities are decaying while life in upper-class suburbs is 
the most affluent in 11istory. Throughout American society, 
the distribution of wealth and income is grossly unequal 
"ancJ has changed little since the beginning of the century. 
· Not only are the benefits of growth unequally distrib· 
uted, but the very content of economic growth is distorted. 
The social costs of ·growth-;-such diseconomies as pollu-
tion, industrial injuries, destruction of neighborhoods-are 
little considered. Far from being provided with a market· 
pl-ace of num~rous goods ·and services, consumers actually 
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enjoy smaller and more trivial choices. We are oftered 
hundreds of colors of lipsticks, but have no choice between 
the private auto and adequate mass transit. There are 
more medical shows on TV than there are decent health 
plans to choose among. In most cities, you can't shop at a 
farmers' market or a co-op; there is only the giant 
shopping center, which offers the same brand products 
from coast to coast. . 
Public enterprise combined wit'h noncoercive planning 
can be used to bring much of the economy under public 
control without resorting to Soviet-style command plan-
ning. But the structure of activities within enterprise will 
decide whether workers enjoy democratic participation, 
whethet external diseconomies are considered as costs of 
production. and whether consumers have a voice in the 
economics of the state. It is in such internal structure that 
the public enterprises of Western Europe have been 
deficient. 
Clerks in the publicly owned French banks recently went 
on strike to protest working conditions and the authoritar-
ian attitudes of top management. The nationalized indus-
tries in Britain have had consumer councils for years, but 
since these depend on the industry boards for staff and 
budget, they have no independence and can rarely criticize 
the industry. In Italy, neither workers nor consumers have 
much voice in the decision making of the firms that com-
prise the state holding company. In all three countries, 
public accountability is exercised mainly through parfia-
mentary'committees. This has prevented gross inefficiency 
and corruption it} the public enterprises, but it is ina~­
quate for the goal of a really democratic economy. 
If new public enterprises are established in the United 
States, ;tccountability through participation by workers 
and consumers will have to be built into their structures 
and operation. It is also necessary to consider the scope of 
a public enterprise strategy. The policy goal will determine 
the type·and level of an enterprise-whether, for example, 
it is to be city-owned, rather than owned by the state or 
federal government. And some tasks will be handled 
directly by the government in the public interest. . 
In 1:he short run, for instance, public .enterprises need 
not be primarily concerned with the distribution of wealth 
and income. Over time, the distribution of income will be 
improved by more even dev.elopment. However, quicker 
results can be obtained by adopting tax reform along the 
lines proposed by Philip Stem in The Rape of the Tax-
payer. The Tax JuStice Act of 1976, which embodies most 
of Stem's recommendations, will soon be introduced in 
Congress. 
Tax reform, combined with greater attention to working 
conditions and workplace democracy, also opens a new 
approach to inflation. One of the stimulants to inflation is 
the attitude that everyone' must get a share now; unions 
bid up wages in negotiations because they know how 
unjust the system is. If workerS felt that sacrifices were 
made equally, they might well be more responsive to a 
"social contract." They might lower wage demands in 
exchange for tax justice and more freedom. in the work-
place, as well as limitations on executives' salaries. But 
such trade-oft's are unlikely until the federal government is 
Committed to real economic fairness. · 
New public enterprises ·should certainly be run demo-
cratically; but they cannot, by policy alone, eliminate hier-
archy and assure participation. Workplace democracy will 
be introduced in most firms only when the workers them-
selves decide to exercise control. However, public.control of 
the government, rather than simply the existence of public 
enterprise, can speed the process. 
Through procurement practices, health and safety 
standards, etc., the government has enormous power to 
encourage the democratizatiQn of work in private firms. 
For the purpose of broadening consumer choice, public 
enterprise can break into the "conspiracy of silence" main-
tained among oligopolistic firms. Competitive public enter-
prises in major industries can force private companies to 
be more responsive to the real needs of society. 
A combination of competitive public enterprises and a 
strong reform-minded government could foster the. devel-
opment of alternative economic institutions, thereby 
broadening ownership patterns. At the national level, a 
Co-op Development Bank (as proposed by the Cooperative 
League of the U.S.A.) could lend funds and make available 
technical assistance to a variety of producer-owned 
ventures. A national development banking system, current-
ly being researched by Senator Kennedy's staff, could offer 
"front-end" capital to community development corpora-
tions in underdeveloped areas. . 
Each state could have a state-owned bank and insurance 
company. The province of British Columbia operates a 
successful insurance company and a financial institution, 
the B.C. Savings and Trust. North Dakota boasts the only 
state bank in this country, a legacy from the days when the 
Populist-oriented Non Partisan League governed the state. 
A state bank could receive all or part of the state's tax 
money. It would act enterpreneurially, yet on sound finan-
cial principles, marketing its services aggressively and 
seeking. customers by providing first-rate consumer 
services. · 
Similarly, a public insurance company would provide 
consumer-oriented service, instead of mystifying customers 
with fine print, as s0 many: companies do today. The com-
pany's capital would be invested primarily within the state, 
as is done by the Wisconsin Life Fund, currently the . only 
state-run consumer insurance program in the country, 
Cities could establish their own banks or development 
funds, using city tax revenues as initial deposits. They 
could purchase urban land so as to control rationally the 
city's development; they would also help to create new 
city-based businesses, both public and private. 
At the same time, the federal government should create 
a government-owned holding company, which would 
purchase controlling interest in a major firm in every lead-
ing industry. In addition, when a private firm asked for a 
subsidy, as Pan Am has done, the holding company could 
exchange the subsidy for some equity and a seat or two on 
the board. Rather than doling out public money to ailing 
private enterprises, as is the current practice, the govern- · 
ment should see to it that the public gets som~ing for its 
money. This would not mean that the holding company 
would automatically bail out every failing private firm; 
some inefficient firms should fail and other government 
programs such as public eD?-ployment would deal with the 
displaced workers. 
The C~uncil of Economic Advisers should be broadened 
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into a national economic planning agency, as Senators 
Humphrey and Javits have proposed. Planners would work in close communication with the new competitive public 
enterprises owned by the holding company, and the' data 
provided by the public firms would give the government a 
sound basis for serious "jawboning" with private firms 
over their investment and pricing plans. 
There is nothing visionary in this outline of a democratic 
economy. The policies described are to some extent in 
practice in other Western democratic countries or have been put forward in legislation as part of a militant reform program. The only thing novel here is the recommendation 
that the whole strategy of political economics be put forward in one embracing pattern. It is time that reformers in the United States, particularly the Democratic Party, 
stop nibbling at problems and heed Galbraith's words that 
the needed economic changes are fundamental, not 
cosmetic. 0 
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